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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines public-to-private leveraged buyouts (LBOs) in Europe 
that occurred between 1998 and 2011. Using a sample of 127 companies that 
went private through LBO, we investigate both the value gains generated to the 
pre-buyout shareholders of target companies and the sources of these variations 
in the stock performance. The results of the cross-sectional regression analysis 
support the agency cost and information asymmetry theories, as companies 
with high free cash flow or companies that have been undervalued by the 
market tend to reap strong abnormal returns. In addition, using a sample of 72 
buyout firms with sufficient financial data and a matched-control sample of 
peer groups, we examine, through logistic regression methodology, the 
determinants that affect the likelihood of public-to-private buyout transactions. 
The findings are consistent with the free cash flow theory, as mature companies 
with excess cash seem to be more likely candidates for such deals.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Public-to-private buyouts became a prominent acquisition type during the 
1980s’ merger wave. In this period, whole businesses or divisions of 
corporations with poor operating performance were taken private by specialized 
investment firms, referred as private equity firms. Such acquisitions were 
financed using relatively large amount of debt with the remaining consideration 
funded through equity (Povaly, 2010). This groundbreaking financing mix gave 
rise to leveraged buyouts (LBOs thereafter) which in many cases proved to be 
the source of superior value creation and contributed to the growth of private 
equity market in the last decades. Following the acquisition of the buyout firm, 
public shareholders are bought out and the company is subsequently delisted 
from the stock exchange. The private equity firm which provides the majority 
of equity capital supervises the buyout process and monitors the company 
following the LBO (Rosenbaum and Pearl, 2010).  
The current thesis investigates a sample of public-to-private LBOs that took 
place in Western Europe between 1998 and 2011. The main purpose of the 
study is to examine the wealth effects of the leveraged buyout announcements 
and identify the characteristics of the buyout targets that favor such 
transactions. The research questions that the present study attempts to explore 
are the following: 
1. What is the generated return of the public-to-private LBOs in Western 
Europe for the pre-buyout shareholders and what are the different 
sources of these gains? 
2. What are the determinants of public-to-private LBOs in Western 
Europe? 
To provide an unequivocal answer to these questions, we employ a sample 
127 European LBOs by employing the classical event study methodology. We 
also deploy equality testing and regression analysis in order to uncover the 
major characteristics of LBO targets that may affect the possibility of 
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occurrence of LBOs. For this purpose, we form a matched-sized control sample 
of public firms which meet specified criteria. 
The majority of studies on public-to-private LBO activity refer to U.S. 
market, especially in the first wave of LBOs which ended in the end of 80s. 
However, during the last twenty years the private equity market has developed 
in a global manner and the nature of transactions has changed to some extent. 
Recent LBO activity in Europe is an academic topic that requires further 
investigation. Empirical research on European deals comes from a few studies 
in which many cases led to controversial results. This study, therefore, aims at 
contributing to the existing literature by providing evidence from a market that 
is relatively under-researched. Moreover, the current study extends recent 
studies on the topic by including LBO deals that took place during the period of 
financial crisis. Although, deals after 2008 are few in the whole sample, the 
results of this study are expected to incorporate the latest trends in the buyout 
market following the structural changes caused by financial crisis. 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 is completed after a brief 
documenting on the evolution of the buyout market over time. Chapter 2 
reviews the academic works related to the research area and sets the theoretical 
framework of the analysis. Chapter 3 describes the data selection process and 
the methodology employed for the purpose of the data analysis. Chapter 4 
reports the empirical results with regard to previous studies. Finally, Chapter 5 
presents the conclusions of the thesis. 
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1.2 THE EVOLUTION OF THE BUYOUT MARKET  
LBOs first emerged as an important phenomenon in late of 1980s in the U.S. 
market. However, the continental Europe did not catch on, although it was also 
experiencing a merger boom, as well. Differences in the legal and tax 
environment have been documented as the main obstacles posed to investors 
(Povaly, 2010). During the same period, only the UK experienced an explosive 
growth in the management buyouts (MBOs) in which the acquiring firm 
consists mostly of the buyout firm’s management. The U.S. buyout market 
reached its peak in 1989 after which it slowed down due to several bankruptcies 
caused by over-leveraging of acquired firms (Povaly, 2010). After mid 1990s, 
however, LBO market recovered and experienced global growth following the 
technology boom of the same period. European transactions increased 
significantly in terms of volume and value till the end of the decade. Private 
equity activity declined during 2001-2002 due to the technology stock market 
crisis; nevertheless, by the end of 2003 it experienced further growth. The 
harmonization of national corporate and tax laws across European Union 
benefited private equity firms in fund raising and managing their investments. 
The favourable market conditions that prevailed this period allowed more risky 
investments to larger firms and with more aggressive financing structures. This 
growth, however, was irretrievably ceased after the crisis that burst in debt 
markets in 2008 (Scholes and Wright, 2009). As outlined by Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2008), LBO evolution patterns exhibit cyclicality which is 
associated with the activity in the leverage loan market. 
The UK is regarded as the most well-established buyout market in Europe 
(Povaly, 2010). The growth in the European activity observed in 2003 – 2007 
stems to large extent from continental Europe. As for the public-to-private 
LBOs, however, the UK market has performed significantly better than the 
other European countries. Almost 70% of the whole transactions completed in 
Western Europe during the last 15 years took place in the UK. Among the rest 
countries, France has the more intense activity followed by Sweden, 
Netherlands, Germany and Ireland. 
Figure 1 presents the public-to-private buyouts completed in Western 
Europe during the last 15 years in terms of volume and value. The LBO activity 
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is observed to follow cyclical pattern and to be concentrated around 1999 and 
2006. Although years surrounding 1999 seem to be of the more intense activity, 
in terms of values, 2006 is by far the more important, due to the large-sized 
buyouts that took place in the same period. It should be pointed also the 
unprecedented drop in the buyout activity after the debt market crisis in 2008 
which made leverage scarce and costly. Moreover, latest figures show that 
European buyout market has not yet managed to recover from this market 
malaise. 
 
Figure 1: Public-to-private LBOs in Western Europe (1996-2011) 
 
                                                                                                                             Source: Thomson One 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following section reviews the pertinent literature for LBO transactions. The 
first part discusses the findings of previous studies on sources of shareholder 
wealth gains surrounding LBO announcements. In the second part, it is briefly 
presented the characteristics outlined by literature as potential determinants of 
LBO firms. 
2.1.1 Shareholder wealth gains in reaction to LBOs 
The significant development of public-to-private activity in the U.S. during 80s 
motivated academics to study the driving forces of the gains accrued to pre-
buyout shareholders from going private transactions. Various studies in the 
U.S. market found empirical evidence of positive excess returns on the buyout 
announcements. However, few of these studies agreed on the sources of these 
gains.  
De Angelo et al. (1984) suggested that abnormal returns generated to 
shareholders surrounding the announcement period can be mainly attributed to 
the ownership structure changes that take place in going private transactions 
and are assumed to enhance organizational efficiency. Grammatikos and Swary 
(1986), on the other hand, stated that stock price movements imply uncertainty 
about the success of the buyout and empirically proved that firms with less 
volatile history of stock movements experience even more positive stock price 
reactions. Studies on the U.S. buyout activity of the same period tested various 
potential drivers of these gains following the framework of similar reports for 
different MandA deals. These studies suggested that positive excess returns 
represent a sharing of post-buyout gains and thus, investigated their drivers 
among the saving of public listing costs or wealth transfers from employees and 
debtholders (Torabzadeh and Bertin, 1987).  
Lehn and Poulsen (1989), who investigated public-to-private activity of 
1980-1987, were the first who attempted to relate abnormal returns with the 
free cash flow theory according to which companies with free cash flows suffer 
from conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders concerning the 
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distribution of excess cash (Jensen, 1986). The results of their analysis 
supported Jensen’s theory indicating significant positive relationship between 
the free cash flow and the magnitude of pre-buyout shareholders’ returns.  
Carow and Roden (1997) analysed public-to-private LBOs of the first wave 
(1981-1990) and documented statistically significant positive excess returns to 
pre-buyout stockholders. They investigated for the sources of these gains 
among the characteristics outlined by Opler and Titman (1991 and 1993) as 
factors affecting the probability of going private through LBO. The chosen set 
of variables combined assumptions of the free cash flow theory with firm or 
deal specific characteristics, such as deal pricing, stock volatility and changes 
in leverage and corporate governance structure. Their results indicated that 
companies with excess cash flow that have been undervalued by the market 
demonstrate higher abnormal returns. In addition, these returns have been 
proved to be greater, the lower the volatility in the historic stock performance 
of the buyout companies.  
After mid 1990s, buyout market experienced new development, not only in 
the U.S. but in Europe as well, especially in the UK. Following this 
development, analysts investigated the reasoning of stock price increases 
surrounding the announcements of this new wave of LBOs. These studies have 
been based upon previous analyses in the U.S. market, however, they are 
assumed to have accounted for the distinctive features of European market as 
well. As highlighted by Cumming et al. (2007), the recent buyout activity 
sustained the return patterns reported in studies of the first wave of buyouts. 
Andres et al. (2005) investigated the market reaction to public-to-private 
announcements that took place in Europe from 1996 to 2002. Employing the 
event study analysis, they empirically proved that these announcements yield 
considerable abnormal returns to shareholders. The parameters employed for 
identifying these returns included variables such as the shareholders’ 
monitoring over management actions, the undervaluation of the companies due 
to information asymmetries, differences in the legal environment, wealth 
transfers from employees and tax benefits. The most important finding of the 
cross sectional regression analysis was the positive significant relationship 
between monitoring and abnormal returns, supporting the argument that the 
mitigation of agency costs causes abnormal returns. From the rest of variables 
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examined the only significant relationship identified was the market 
inefficiency parameter according to which undervalued companies proved to 
demonstrate higher excess returns. 
Andres et al. (2007) examined shareholder wealth effects in a sample of 
European public-to-private LBOs that took place between 1997 and 2005 and 
found significant positive abnormal returns to the firm’s shareholders on the 
LBOs announcement day. Moreover, the authors investigated the determinants 
of abnormal returns looking at corporate governance characteristics, agency 
conflicts in the buyout firms and historic stock price performance in relation to 
market inefficiencies. Cross sectional regression results supported the main 
hypothesis of the study that corporate governance issues have impact on 
shareholders’ wealth gains. Poor minority equity protection was found to have 
explanatory power as well. Concerning agency theory, the results showed that 
companies with more scattered shareholdings and less intense monitoring 
experience higher returns. Finally, the analysis identified that information 
asymmetries and market inadequate valuation of LBO companies have 
increasing effect on stock price reaction. In contrast with previous studies 
however, this study found no significant relationship between free cash flow 
and the excess returns observed in LBOs. 
Sudarsanam et al. (2007) examined UK going-private buyouts of 1997-
2005 and reported significant abnormal returns in line with previous studies. 
The most important finding of their analysis is that these abnormal returns have 
been proportional to firm’s default risk. That is, the higher the default risk, the 
stronger the market reaction. Moreover, the findings of the study showed post-
announcement wealth gains for companies with larger free cash flow and low 
growth rates which were more undervalued by the market.  
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2.1.2 Typical characteristics of LBO targets  
Various studies aimed at identifying typical characteristics among buyout 
targets that determine the likelihood of a LBO. This section summarizes the 
major characteristics examined to affect the possibility of a LBO deal. 
1. High Free Cash Flow 
According to the free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986) companies with high 
cash flow suffer from agency costs stemming from the conflicting interests 
between managers and shareholders over the distribution of excess cash. 
Managers with large free cash flows at their discretion have incentives to waste 
organizational resources on negative net present value projects, rather than pay 
out the excess cash to shareholders through dividends or share repurchase 
schemes (Le Nadant and Perdreau, 2006). Lehn and Poulsen (1989) found a 
significant relationship between the undistributed cash flow and the going-
private activity. With regard to this finding, Opler and Titman (1991 and 1993) 
documented significant differences in the characteristics that proxy the free 
cash flow between LBO targets and their peers. Recent studies, however, have 
not fully supported this theory. According to Nikoskelainen’s (2006) analysis 
on European LBOs during 1997-2003, LBO activity has not been driven by 
high cash flow.  Similar results were produced by Sudarsanam et al. (2007) for 
their UK sample of LBOs.  
2. Low Growth 
Another characteristic that has been identified as a driver of LBOs is the low 
growth rates performed by LBO candidates. Low growth rates relate to the free 
cash flow theory and indicate management inefficiency in recognizing and 
exploiting growth opportunities (Rosenbaum and Pearl, 2009). Opler and 
Titman (1991 and 1993) found significant negative relationship between the 
growth perspectives of firms and going private likelihood. Similarly, 
Nikoskelainen (2006) highlighted that the likelihood for LBO as outlined by the 
recent buyout activity in Europe depends on the medium term growth of the 
target companies. 
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3. Low Capital Requirements 
Low capex requirements are regarded to enhance a company’s cash flow 
generation (Rosenbaum and Pearl, 2009). Consequently, this characteristic is 
closely related to free cash flow theory, too. Great amounts of undistributed 
cash flow over which agency conflicts emerge, are mainly observed in mature 
businesses with low capital investment needs. Thus, capital expenditures can be 
used as an indicator of the operating age of the company. Maturity is also 
associated with the growth prospects of firms discussed above. Consistent with 
this theoretical framework, Nikoskelainen (2006) empirically found that mature 
companies are more likely to go private through LBOs.  
4. Leverage and cash flow volatility 
A lot of discussion has been spent about the involvement of high debt levels in 
LBO transactions. Kaplan (1989) studied the post-buyout performance of 
buyouts and outlined that high leverage is an important source of wealth, due to 
the significant tax benefits. Lehn and Poulsen (1989) documented that tax 
incentives arising from tax deductible interest expenses on debt affect 
positively the probability of a firm to go private. However, subsequent studies 
identified that the majority of LBO firms tend to use more debt than the amount 
needed to maximize tax advantages. Opler and Titman (1991) highlighted that 
apart from tax considerations, leverage can also reduce agency costs by 
inducing management incentives to align with those of investors. However, as 
stated by Sudarsanam et al (2007), additional leverage requires debt capacity 
and the more this debt capacity the greater the probability for LBO.  Opler and 
Titman (1993) identified also that firms with volatile cash flows may be not 
suited for high leverage since they are more likely to experience costly defaults. 
On the other hand, Nikoskelainen’s (2006) study on a sample of European 
transactions indicated that firms with more volatile cash flows were strong 
LBO candidates and attributed this volatility to the relevant information 
asymmetry.  
The collateral value of assets has been regarded as an important factor in 
determining LBO likelihood. According to the study of Brinkhuis and De 
Maeseneire (2009) on the financial structure of recent European LBOs, the 
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collateral value of the firm’s asset drives the relevant cost of debt and thus 
determines to a great extent the LBO probability.  
5. Information asymmetry and undervaluation by market 
Informational asymmetry arises when outside investors and managers have 
different information about the firm’s future operating performance (Palepu, 
1990). Such asymmetry between managers and shareholders is assumed to 
enhance agency costs and has triggered analysts to study the way it may induce 
companies to go private. In addition, informational asymmetry relates to market 
undervaluation since all available information does not reach all the market 
participants at the same time. Opler and Titman (1991 and 1993) stated that 
informational asymmetry increases agency conflicts and also the chances of 
undervaluation of a firm since not all information is available to investors. They 
found significant relationship between LBO likelihood and undervaluation 
effects especially when informational asymmetry is combined with high free 
cash flow. Sudarsanam et al. (2007) did not identified market mispricing as a 
significant determinant of LBO likelihood.  
6. Corporate governance and managerial holding 
The equity ownership held by managers has attracted much attention by all the 
studies investigating the LBO targets characteristics. Opler and Titman (1991) 
reported that poorly monitored management can be a motivation behind LBO 
choice. LBO transaction can be a chance for managers to increase their stake in 
the company and, thus an incentive to try harder for the maximization of firm’s 
value. Sudarsanam et al. (2007), however, stated that the relationship between 
the managerial ownership and the probability of public-to-private buyout is not 
straightforward. They underlined that very high managerial holdings may 
produce managerial entrenchment. Managers with large ownership stakes may 
be more likely to go private to realize immediate gains in the form of takeover 
premiums and private benefits of control. Therefore, higher managerial 
ownership might imply greater probability for LBO. The results of their study 
supported this hypothesis and suggested that the likelihood of going private is 
related to the marginal increase in the managerial shareholding as well. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3.1  SAMPLE SELECTION 
Among the challenges faced during this study was the appropriate sample 
construction in order to empirically test both the stock price reactions to LBO 
announcements and the characteristics of LBO firms. Using the Thomson One 
database, there have been identified completed public-to-private buyouts 
announced between 1998 and 2011, for which both the target and the acquirer 
originate from the Western Europe. Transactions with values less than 100 mil 
$ were eliminated from the sample. Small sized transactions are often driven by 
exceptional characteristics or urging circumstances (Nikoskelainen, 2006) 
which could distort the analysis of this study.   
The entire capital of the companies included in the sample has been bought 
via a tender offer and the companies have been subsequently delisted from the 
stock exchange. Transactions which have not led to a 100% ownership by the 
acquirer were excluded from the sample in order to eliminate effects caused by 
differences in the legal treatment of minority shareholders among European 
countries. The final sample was selected after eliminating buyouts for which 
sufficient stock data of the acquired firms were not available. This gives a final 
sample of 127 transactions for which the announcement effects on pre-buyout 
stockholders’ wealth can be investigated. This final sample is assumed to be 
representative since it excludes only a small fraction of the transactions that did 
not meet the prescribed criteria. Stock prices and financial statement accounts 
of the buyout firms have been collected from Bloomberg.  
Details about the distribution of the selected sample across the examined 
period or across different countries and sectors are provided in Table 1. We can 
see that the sample is most heavily concentrated in the period 1999-2001 and 
2006-2007 when there is a substantial increase in the number and value of 
LBOs. Such growth reflects the increased importance and diffusion of public-
to-private deals which is strongly related to more favourable capital market 
conditions (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2008). LBO market activity seems to 
unprecedentedly slow down after the turmoil in debt markets in 2008. 
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Concerning the geographic distribution, the LBO sample is dominated by 
deals in the UK, which is assumed to be the most developed buyout market in 
Europe (Povaly, 2010).  The rest of the LBO deals are dispersed across 
European countries, with more intense buyout activity to be observed in Ireland 
and Sweden, which is supposed to have the world’s third highest private equity 
investments as a percentage of GDP (Bergström et al., 2007). In the other 
European countries, LBO market seems to be less active in terms of public-to-
private transactions. 
Regarding the distribution of the sample across industries, we observe a 
sample concentration on specific sectors such as industrials, consumer staples, 
retail and media. As pointed out by Strömberg (2007) the changing nature in 
the private equity market is reflected to the increase of LBOs in high growth 
sectors following the mid 1990s.  
 
Table 1: LBOs’ number, average transaction value, median transaction value and sum of 
transaction values by year (Panel A), by country (Panel B) and by industry (Panel C) 
Panel A 
LBO Year Number of LBOs 
Average 
Transaction Value 
(mil $) 
Median 
Transaction Value 
(mil $) 
Sum of 
Transaction Values 
(mil $) 
1998 5 484.98 315.03 2,424.92 
1999 25 434.75 212.16 10,868.63 
2000 14 521.28 444.70 7,297.88 
2001 15 616.17 431.82 8,736.01 
2002 7 1,215.12 727.43 8,505.87 
2003 7 948.42 782.49 6,638.91 
2004 6 1,099.91 832.22 6,599.49 
2005 8 2,071.93 1,221.46 16,575.40 
2006 20 3,270.25 696.32 65,405.08 
2007 13 3,648.20 1,425.77 47,426.60 
2008 3 1,609.55 601.76 4,828.65 
2009 1 245.41 245.41 245.41 
2010 2 3,003.17 3,003.17 6,006.33 
2011 1 99.64 99.64 99.64 
Total  
1998 - 2011 127 1,509.12 517.62 191,658.83 
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Panel B 
LBO Country 
Number of 
LBOs 
Average 
Transaction Value 
(mil $) 
Median 
Transaction Value 
(mil $) 
Sum of 
Transaction Values 
(mil $) 
UK 89 1,608.73 517.62 143,177.34 
Ireland 8 1,324.77 425.05 10,598.14 
Sweden 8 1,336.85 641.35 10,694.83 
France 3 512.77 388.41 1,538.32 
Denmark 3 2,063.71 866.17 6,191.12 
Netherlands 3 358.04 188.53 1,074.11 
Germany 2 360.15 360.15 720.30 
Italy 2 389.86 389.86 779.71 
Spain 2 3,475.83 3,475.83 6,951.66 
Norway 2 770.29 770.29 1,540.58 
Jersey 1 786.51 786.51 786.51 
Austria 1 118.69 118.69 118.69 
Luxembourg 1 211.86 211.86 211.86 
Iceland 1 6,389.37 6,389.37 6,389.37 
Finland 1 886.28 886.28 886.28 
Total  
1998 - 2011 127 1,509.12 517.62 191,658.83 
 
Panel C 
LBO Industry 
Number of 
LBOs 
Average 
Transaction Value 
(mil $) 
Median 
Transaction Value 
(mil $) 
Sum of 
Transaction Values 
(mil $) 
Industrials 24 2,079.48 432.01 49,907.62 
Consumer Staples 16 528.84 263.47 8,461.46 
Retail 14 2,404.04 853.43 33,656.55 
Media/Entertainment 12 884.02 332.81 10,608.25 
Real Estate 11 772.37 727.43 8,496.03 
Energy and Power 10 2,423.47 1,203.67 24,234.72 
Consumer Products 9 1,604.93 517.62 14,444.41 
Materials 9 1,092.94 936.31 9,836.49 
Healthcare 7 2,580.90 2,936.21 18,066.32 
Financials 7 1,046.36 1,062.73 7,324.51 
High Technology 7 557.20 371.64 3,900.38 
Telecommunications 1 2,722.10 2,722.10 2,722.10 
   
  
Total  127 1,509.12 517.62 191,658.83 
 
In most public-to-private buyouts, the firms acquired are delisted soon after the 
buyout proposal release. The following table presents statistics on the time that 
elapse between the deal announcement and the subsequent delisting of the 
company. Table 2 shows that it usually takes one to two months for the actively 
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traded public companies to be delisted after the intention of going private 
through LBOs. In some cases delisting occurs in less than two months after the 
LBO announcement, whereas 10% of the companies are delisted after more 
than six months following the event.  
 
Table 2: Days after public-to-private deal announcement till the delisting of the buyout 
company 
Days from deal announcement  
to delisting 
LBO firms of the sample 
≤ 60 17 
61 – 120 79 
121 – 180 18 
> 180 13 
Mean 109 
Median 86 
Minimum 14 
Max 766 
 
Another issue of the buyout market which has attracted much of the academic 
interest is related to the longevity of LBOs. LBOs are primarily sponsored by 
private equity funds of limited life and short investment horizon. According to 
previous studies, private equity funds, on average, exit their investments after a 
period of 3 – 7 years (Strömberg, 2007). The most common outcomes of such 
investments are the sale of the firm to a strategic buyer other than the private 
equity firm, the trade-sale to another private equity-backed firm (Secondary 
buyout) or even the reverting of the buyout firm to a public status through an 
IPO. However, it is common for buyout firms to remain for long period under a 
private ownership scheme, whereas a proportion of these firms result in 
financial distress (Povaly, 2010).  
The ultimate outcome of the sample of LBOs is provided in Table 3. To 
detect the outcome of these transactions, we firstly investigated whether LBO 
firms are involved in a subsequent MandA transaction. Then, we check for 
possible re-listings. Table 3 displays that the majority of buyout firms remain in 
private ownership. Given the up-to-date dataset used, it is not surprising that 
Going private through LBOs: Empirical evidence from European markets 
 
20 
 
more than 40% of the LBOs have not yet exited. Concerning the outcome, the 
most common exit route seems to be the trade sale to strategic buyers, followed 
by re-listings through IPOs and secondary buyouts. Strömberg (2007) pointed 
out the significant drop in the IPO exits compared to the past deals and 
attributed this drop to the toughening of the capital market conditions which 
affected IPO markets. Another important issue of the exit behavior is the 
relatively modest rates of firms led to financial distress taking into 
consideration the significant debt levels involved in such transactions. Less 
than 10% of the firms included in the sample went bankrupt, either in the form 
of debt restructuring, or of insolvency proceedings.  
Table 3: Outcome of LBO investments and average holding period  
Type of outcome LBO firms of the sample Average holding period (years) 
Strategic Sale 
25 
(19.69%) 
5.48 
IPO 
14 
(11.02%) 
4.14 
Secondary Buyout 
10 
(7.87%) 
3.90 
Still Private 
55 
(43.31%) 
- 
Financial Distress 
11 
(8.66%) 
- 
Merged 
6 
(4.72%) 
- 
Unknown 
6 
(4.72%) 
- 
Note: The statistics presented are obtained in the second half of 2012 
The research on the relationship between firm characteristics and the likelihood 
of LBO is limited. The main reasons are the limited pre-buyout financial data 
for a period of up-to-three years before the announcement and the difficulty in 
forming a control sample of peer companies with sufficient data for the same 
date range. These data constraints led to the formation of a sub-sample of 72 
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transactions. For the LBO likelihood analysis, for each buyout firm a peer 
group of five companies is assigned. Each peer group consists of five firms that 
were selected after meeting certain criteria: Firstly, the selected competitors 
should be public companies of the same industry. In order to identify the 
industry of LBO firms and their peers, 4-digit SIC codes were employed. Apart 
from matching industry codes, the selected peers should have the same size 
with sample firms. For this purpose, companies with revenues of more than 
100% or less than 50% of the sample buyout firm were excluded from the 
initial peer candidates’ sample. In case that more than five companies meeting 
these criteria, the final group was constructed by preferably selecting 
companies of the same country or of more similar size. This procedure led to 
the sample of 72 matching peer groups which in most cases consist of different 
European countries. Table 4 presents the distribution of this sub-sample. There 
are no significant variations across years, countries and sectors compared to the 
whole sample, with the exception of some countries that are not included in this 
sub-sample. 
Table 4: Distribution of sub-sample used in analysis of LBO likelihood determinants by year 
(Panel A), by country (Panel B) and by industry (Panel C) 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
LBO Year 
Number of 
LBOs 
Target 
Country 
Number of 
LBOs 
Target Industry 
Number of 
LBO firms 
1998 1 UK 51 Industrials 15 
1999 13 Ireland 5 Consumer Staples 9 
2000 9 Sweden 3 Retail 10 
2001 8 France 0 Media /Entertainment 6 
2002 5 Denmark 1 Real Estate 8 
2003 6 Netherlands 3 Energy and Power 7 
2004 4 Germany 2 Consumer Products 4 
2005 5 Italy 2 Materials 3 
2006 8 Spain 1 Healthcare 4 
2007 8 Norway 1 Financials 0 
2008 3 Jersey 1 High Technology 5 
2009 1 Austria 0 Telecommunications 1 
2010 1 Luxembourg 0   
2011 0 Iceland 1   
  
Finland 1   
   
   
Total  72 Total 72 Total 72 
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3.2  METHODOLOGY  
This section describes the methodology and techniques applied for the 
investigation of the European LBOs.  
3.2.1 Estimation of abnormal returns 
In order to capture possible wealth effects that public-to-private LBOs generate 
the classical event study analysis is employed. Excess returns are computed 
utilizing 250 days prior to the event of the LBO announcement and ends up 10 
days after. The event window for calculating excess returns consists of 21 days, 
that is, from day t=-10 to t=+10 around the event day (day 0), whereas the 
estimation period used for the calculation of the model parameters is defined as 
[-250, -10]. We calculate abnormal returns around the event window using the 
market model and the market-adjusted model (Brown and Warner, 1985). 
Specifically, abnormal returns  of each company are computed as the 
difference between the realized return and the normally expected return 
 as following: 
                                                                                                                (1) 
Stock returns are calculated as continuously compounded returns by the 
following formula: 
                                                                                                                            (2) 
where and are the daily closing stock prices at day t and t-1.   
Market model returns for each security  in time  is given by: 
                                                                                                                      (3) 
where the  is the market return. The parameters  and  are estimated on the 
estimation period by regressing the security returns on the market returns. 
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The market-adjusted model, on the other hand, assumes that the ex ante return 
on a security is constant across securities and can differ across time. 
Consequently, the expected return on a security  in time  is defined as: 
                                                                                                                (4) 
This study uses both these two different excess returns models in order to 
strengthen the robustness of the results. 
Average abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are also calculated 
in the event window. The average abnormal return on day t in the event 
window across a sample of N securities is computed as follows: 
                                                                                                          (5) 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for a period of time are calculated as 
the sum of the daily excess returns. 
                                                                                                                (6) 
In order to examine whether public-to-private announcements have significant 
wealth effects, average abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns need to be 
statistically different from zero. The statistical significance is tested using the t- 
test. We also use cross-sectional regression analysis in order to detect the 
factors that explain stock price abnormality during the period surrounding the 
LBO announcement day. The parameters used in regression analysis are 
selected in line with the findings of prior studies and include variables that 
represent the cash flow profile and the growth prospects of the company 
combined with market mispricing  indicators.  
As it has been previously mentioned, the increased use of debt proxy for 
the elimination of agency costs caused by the divergent interests of 
asymmetrically informed managers and shareholders (Jensen, 1986). According 
to Opler and Titman (1991 and 1993), the agency conflict of interests over the 
distribution of cash surplus can be mitigated through LBOs, since the 
substantial debt servicing costs reduces the amount of free cash. Previous 
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studies such as that of Lehn and Poulsen (1989) and Carow and Roden (1997) 
identified free cash flow variables to be positively related to the wealth gains. 
Following these studies, we use the free cash flow-to-total assets ratio as an 
additional independent variable for examining the drivers of abnormal returns 
to pre-buyout shareholders. 
In the presence of information asymmetry, the market value of a company 
might not reflect all available information and, therefore company’s security 
might be mispriced. Previous studies indicate that companies that have been 
undervalued by the market experienced significant positive returns following 
LBO announcements (Andres et al., 2005 and 2007). Opler and Titman (1993) 
and Carow and Roden  (1997) utilized Tobin’s q ratio in their analysis to 
capture the mispricing of companies by the market. Tobin’s q ratio is defined as 
the ratio of book value of debt plus the market value of equity divided by the 
book value of assets. When the value of the ratio is less than 1 the company is 
assumed to be undervalued by the market. Opler and Titman (1993) and Carow 
and Roden (1997) found a significant negative Tobin’s q coefficient implying 
that the more undervalued the firms the higher gains to stockholders.  
Except for market mispricing Tobin’s q ratio is also used as a proxy for 
growth opportunities. To the extent that the market value exceeds the 
replacement cost of its assets indicates the company’s growth prospects. 
According to Opler and Titman, (1993) and Carow and Roden (1997) low 
growth businesses are more attractive investments for private equity firms. 
They empirically proved that positive announcement effects of LBOs are even 
higher for low growth firms. Consequently, the current study incorporates 
Tobin’s q ratio as another control variable.  
The size effect on abnormal returns is also examined. This variable is 
closely related to the information asymmetry discussed above, in the sense that 
small firms are expected to convey less information to market participants since 
they usually attract less public interest and are less adequately covered by 
financial press (Andres et al., 2005). Small firms are more likely to exhibit 
information asymmetries. The natural logarithm of total assets in the end of the 
last fiscal year prior to the LBO announcement is used and is expected to be 
negatively correlated with the dependent variable. 
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Another variable that has been tested as a source of excess return is the risk 
of the firm. It is alleged that low risk firms can bear more leverage. 
Grammatikos and Swary (1986) and Carow and Roden (1997) examined the 
influence of risk measured by the standard deviation of stock returns prior to 
the event window. Their results showed a significant negative coefficient for 
this variable.  
Finally, year dummies are also used in the cross-sectional regression 
analysis to capture any time effect on the sources of abnormal returns.  
A limitation of this study is that it does not account for qualitative variables 
related to the corporate governance regime or other deal related characteristics. 
In contrast with previous studies which related abnormal returns with variables 
such as management’s equity stake, legal protection or the case of multiple 
bids, this investigation is limited to the financial elements of the leveraged 
buyout firms. 
 
3.2.2 Assessing the determinants of LBO likelihood  
Concerning the likelihood of going private through LBO, we use operating 
characteristics of buyout targets that differ from comparable public companies. 
Mature companies with low growth are typical LBO candidates for several 
reasons. Low growth may be indicative of unexplored growth opportunities and 
the recurring and predictable performance of such mature companies make 
them more attractive investments for private equity firms taking into 
consideration the low risk that allows for high leverage (Rosenbaum and Pearl, 
2009). Growth variables have been examined in the majority of previous 
studies and in many cases were concluded to be significant (Opler and Titman, 
1993; Nikoskelainen, 2006). Regarding the age of the buyout company, mature 
companies are expected to have limited capital investment needs. Therefore, the 
variable selected to represent the maturity of the selected companies is the 
capital expenditure ratio which is defined as the ratio of capital expenditures to 
total assets.    
The free cash flow variable is also tested for LBO targets in comparison 
with their peer groups. As it has already been outlined, high free cash flow is 
related to agency conflicts between managers and stockholders over the 
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distribution of excess cash. On the other hand, LBO candidates should have the 
ability to generate strong and predictable cash flow given the highly leveraged 
capital structure. Cash flow for buyout firms and their peers is measured with 
EBITDA margin, since EBITDA is regarded to be the most suitable cash flow 
measure to indicate the ability of a firm to service its debt. According to Jensen 
(1986), agency problems may have increasing effect on the volatility of cash 
flows generated by the firms’ operations. Opler and Titman (1991) examined 
cash flow volatility as indicator of LBO likelihood. They stated that firms with 
volatile cash flows are less attractive options for private equity market 
concerning the greater probability of default on their debt obligations. 
Nikoskelainen (2006) on the other hand, provided evidence that high volatility 
in cash flows relates to information asymmetry and enhances the probability of 
LBOs. Similarly to his methodology, cash flow volatility is measured in this 
study by the standard deviation of the EBITDA margin the last three fiscal 
years prior to announcement.  
Another important characteristic that an ideal LBO candidate should have 
is operating efficiency enhancement opportunities (Rosenbaum and Pearl, 
2009). There has been a lot of analysis discussing the long term impact of 
LBOs on the performance of acquired firms. Concerning, however, the pre 
buyout operating characteristics of these companies, previous researchers have 
not identified certain common traits among LBO candidates. Opler and Titman 
(1991 and 1993) introduced cost variables such as R & D expenditures and 
other operating expenses to identify their relationship with the likelihood of 
LBO. Nikoskelainen (2006), on the other hand, did not separately examined 
cost variables, but introduced certain efficiency measures which are affected by 
the cost structure of the firms. Following his methodology, the current study 
assesses the effect of the return on assets ratio on the LBO likelihood.  
The ability of the LBO candidate to bear the high debt levels required in 
such transactions is related to the pre buyout leverage levels as outlined in the 
studies of Opler and Titman (1991 and 1993) and Nikoskelainen (2006). Except 
for the cost of capital improvements, gearing enhances the chances that growth 
opportunities can be exploited. The present study accounts for gearing by using 
the interest bearing debt-to-shareholder’s equity ratio as another control 
variable. 
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Much academic interest has been focused on the size of firms going private 
through LBO. The potential for leveraging is alleged to be greater for firms 
with strong asset base. A strong asset base pledged as collateral against a loan 
benefits lenders by increasing the likelihood of principal recovery in case of 
liquidation (Rosenbaum and Pearl, 2009). On the other hand, a firm with little 
asset base can be still an attractive LBO target provided that it generates 
sufficient cash flow. Studies in the demography of private equity market 
indicate that midmarket buyouts are more common than large transactions 
(Strömberg, 2007). This tendency is mainly attributed to the fact that 
uncontrollable large asset base incurs significant capital expenditures and, 
therefore, signify high barriers to entry for the target market. Taking into 
consideration the controversial effects of the firm’s size to the chances of LBO, 
size variable is not included in our analysis. 
Variations in the long-term operating performance between LBO targets 
and peer groups are tested using the two-tailed test for differences in means and 
the Mann-Wilcoxon-Whitney test for differences in medians. The explanatory 
power of the selected variables is then identified through a logistic regression 
analysis. The aim is to measure the likelihood for LBO as a function of 
operational characteristics. 
Table 5 summarizes the set of variable used in defining the LBO 
likelihood and reports the expected signs according to previous studies. Table 6 
presents descriptive statistics for the sub-sample of the 72 public-to-private 
transactions and for the corresponding sample of the 72 peer groups. The 
relevant figures provide evidence that buyout firms have lower capital 
expenditures than their peers and generate higher cash flows. The variations in 
the values between the two samples and statistical inferences arising from these 
differences are discussed in detail in the following section. 
As discussed previously, a limitation of this study is that it assesses the 
probability of LBO transactions only in relation to financial ratios ignoring the 
potential impact of qualitative variables related to the corporate governance 
area. Such variables were excluded due to the difficulty in retrieving sufficient 
data for our analysis. 
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Table 5: Independent variables description and predicted signs 
Variable Name Variable Code Description Predicted Sign(s) 
Growth REVGR_1_0 Revenues growth at the end of the last fiscal year prior to announcement - 
Maturity 
CAPEXPR 
Capital expenditures ratio defined as capital expenditures divided by total 
assets at the end of last fiscal year prior to announcement 
- 
Cash flow generation EBITDAM_0 
EBITDA margin defined as the ratio of EBITDA divided by revenues at 
the end of the last fiscal year prior to announcement 
+ 
Cash flow volatility EBITDAVOL 
Standard deviation of last 3 fiscal years prior to announcement of 
EBITDA margin 
+/- 
Operating efficiency ROA 
Ratio of EBIT (Earnings before interest and taxes) divided by total assets 
in the last fiscal year prior to announcement 
+/- 
Leverage D_E 
Debt-to-equity ratio defined as total debt divided by total shareholder’s 
equity in the last fiscal year prior to announcement 
- 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of LBOs sub-sample and peer groups 
Panel A: LBO targets (N=72) 
Variable Name Code Mean Median Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum 
Growth REVGR_1_0 0.158 0.091 0.285 1.429 -0.299 
Maturity CAPEXPR 0.036 0.035 0.105 0.436 -0.323 
Cash flow generation EBITDAM_0 0.205 0.145 0.173 0.837 0.006 
Cash flow volatility EBITDAVOL 0.023 0.013 0.024 0.119 0.001 
Operating efficiency ROA 0.099 0.092 0.069 0.381 -0.104 
Leverage D_E 0.938 0.534 2.561 21.621 -1.141 
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Panel B: Peer groups of LBO targets (N=72) 
Variable Name Code Mean Median Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum 
Growth REVGR_1_0 0.179 0.147 0.177 0.985 -0.110 
Maturity CAPEXPR 0.068 0.055 0.070 0.229 -0.103 
Cash flow generation EBITDAM_0 0.176 0.146 0.094 0.505 0.044 
Cash flow volatility EBITDAVOL 0.032 0.017 0.042 0.287 0.004 
Operating efficiency ROA 0.092 0.094 0.048 0.194 -0.054 
Leverage D_E 0.682 0.632 0.980 3.800 -4.607 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
4.1 DATA ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
4.1.1 Event Study Analysis results 
Table 7 summarizes the results of the event study analysis. The table reports the 
average abnormal daily returns for each day of the event period (Panel A) and 
the cumulative average abnormal returns for various event windows around the 
event of LBO announcement (Panel B). 
Table 7: Daily average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns based on the 
market model and the market-adjusted model 
Panel A: Average abnormal returns in reaction to public-to-private LBOs 
announcements 
 
Market model Market-adjusted model 
Day relative to event AAR % T-Student AAR % T-Student 
-10 0.215% 0.83 0.189% 0.72 
-9 0.586% 0.37 0.500% 0.31 
-8 0.028% 0.18 -0.031% -0.19 
-7 0.191% 0.95 0.225% 1.04 
-6 0.169% 0.11 0.130% 0.08 
-5 0.501%     2.31** 0.441%   1.91* 
-4 0.722%     2.30** 0.772%     2.44** 
-3 0.348% 1.45 0.297% 1.14 
-2 0.537%     2.09** 0.676%       2.66*** 
-1 1.383%       3.30*** 1.513%       3.72*** 
0 7.091%       9.42*** 7.116%       9.45*** 
1 1.011%       2.60*** 1.152%       2.92*** 
2 0.058% 0.28 0.099% 0.44 
3 0.154% 0.94 0.274% 1.51 
4 0.061% 0.24 0.047% 0.18 
5 0.178%     2.10** 0.280%     2.26** 
6 0.016% 0.24 0.081% 0.68 
7 0.003% 0.03 0.077% 0.47 
8 0.032% 0.23 0.072% 0.43 
9 0.020% 0.21 0.135% 0.97 
10 -0.022% -0.30 0.076% 0.74 
***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level (two-tailed test) 
 
Note: Column 1 lists the days of the event period relative to announcement day (t=0). Columns 2 and 
4 present the daily average abnormal returns (AARs) of each day based on market model and market-
adjusted model respectively. Columns 3 and 5 contain the corresponding test statistics which indicate 
whether the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return can be rejected or not. 
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Panel B: Cumulative Average Abnormal returns in reaction to public-to-private 
LBOs announcements 
 
Market Model Market-adjusted model 
Event Window CARs % t-statistic CARs % t-statistic 
CAR (-10 -1) 4.679% 0.97 4.712% 0.98 
CAR (+1 +10) 1.511% 0.31 2.293% 0.47 
CAR (-1 0) 8.475%       3.93*** 8.629%       4.00*** 
CAR (-1 +1) 9.486%       3.59*** 9.781%       3.89*** 
***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level (two-tailed test) 
 
Note: Column 1 contains different event windows relative to announcement day (t=0). Columns 2 and 
4 present the cumulative average abnormal returns (AARs) of each window based on market model 
and market-adjusted model respectively. Columns 3 and 5 contain the corresponding test statistics 
which indicate whether the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return can be rejected or not. 
 
 
The results show that LBO announcements cause significant positive excess 
returns to pre-buyout shareholders. On the announcement day (t=0), the average 
abnormal return is 7.10% and statistically significant for both models. On the 
days surrounding the release of the buyout [-1, +1] shareholders experience 
significant wealth gains. Since it was not possible to identify the actual time of 
the LBO announcement, we use three days (-1, +1) as event period.  Except for 
the short period around the event, the results show significant positive excess 
returns for other days prior to announcement, as in days t=-2, t=-4, t=-5.   A 
possible explanation of this phenomenon might be rumors or information 
leakages concerning the deal or even other firm relevant events that affect 
positively the stock performance. Significant abnormal returns prior to the 
actual announcement day have been also found by Andres et al (2007) who 
attributed this phenomenon to leakage of information. In addition, taking into 
consideration the dramatic increase in the excess returns taking place on days 0 
and +1, it can be concluded that the information on buyout transaction is 
decoded by the majority of market participants only after the LBO 
announcement.  
Another interesting finding is the significant positive excess returns on 
t=+5. One possible explanation might be a sluggish analyst’s opinions and 
predictions concerning the success and viability of the announced takeover. 
However, it is impossible to distinguish whether these effects are attributed to 
analysts’ opinions or other company news. The results are supported by both 
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methods applied for the calculation of abnormal returns, with a little variation 
on the significance levels in some cases (t=-5 and t=-2). 
As shown by Figure 2 the average cumulative abnormal returns are 
similar for both models used. Moreover, Panel B of Table 7 indicates that the 
two models display similar levels of significance. When alternative event 
widows are examined, the results for both models indicate that in short periods 
around the event [-1, 0] and [-1, +1] the cumulative average abnormal returns 
are 8.50% and 9.50%, respectively and highly significant.  
Figure 2: Average cumulative abnormal returns during the event period based on the market 
model and the market-adjusted model 
 
 
4.1.2 Cross-sectional analysis on sources of shareholders’ wealth gains 
We attempt to find out the determinants of the LBO wealth effects by using 
cross-sectional regression analysis. Specifically, we employ the following OLS 
regression where the dependent variable is the CAR of three days [-1, +1].  
 
The independent variables are checked for existence of multicollinearity. 
The results indicate no significant correlations between the regressors. 
Consequently the whole variable set is simultaneously applied on the 
regression.  
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The results of the cross-sectional regression are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8: Coefficients and t-statistics of the CAR [-1, +1] regression 
Variable Predicted sign Market model Market-adjusted model 
Intercept  
0.240 
  (1.78)* 
0.221 
(1.63) 
FCF ratio 
+ 
0.028 
    (2.07)** 
0.030 
    (2.27)** 
Tobin’s q ratio - 
-0.048 
    (-2.50)** 
-0.048 
       (-2.56)*** 
Variance of 
returns 
- 
-0.008 
 (-0.36) 
 -0.006 
  (-0.28) 
Size - 
-0.008 
 (-0.75) 
 -0.006 
 (-0.81) 
Year Dummies  yes yes 
N  127 127 
 R
2
  0.24 0.22 
F –statistic 
Probability  
(F-statistic)  
 
1.67 
(0.06) 
1.55 
(0.09) 
***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level  
 
Note: Two OLS regressions of the CAR [-1, +1] are performed using a multivariate regression to explain 
the sources of abnormal returns. Columns 3 and 4 present the results based on market model and market-
adjusted model. 
 
The results show that FCF ratio has a positive and significant coefficient at 
the 95% confidence level for both models, indicating that the theory concerning 
the mitigation of agency costs through LBOs is empirically confirmed. In 
addition, Tobin’s q ratio has significant negative influence on the abnormal 
returns during the LBO announcement. As discussed in the previous section, 
Tobin’s q ratio represents two different characteristics. On the one hand, this 
ratio is related with the market valuation of the company. Consequently, the 
results support the hypothesis that information asymmetry implies 
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undervaluation by the market for companies and leads to higher returns 
following the LBO deal. On the other hand, Tobin’s q ratio reflects the growth 
prospects of firms. Therefore, the significant negative coefficient suggests that 
positive announcement effects are even greater for low growth firms. 
Concerning the explanatory power of the risk of the firm, although the 
coefficient has the predicted sign, we cannot support the existence of a 
significant relationship between returns’ volatility and abnormal returns. 
Similarly, the hypothesis that there may be size effects on the magnitude of 
information asymmetry and consequently on the stock price reaction cannot be 
supported, since the relevant t-statistic is insignificant. 
As for the goodness of fit statistics, the values of R
2 
are similar to that of 
previous studies. According to R
2
 the models do not fit the data adequately. 
Finally, the regression residuals have been tested for heteroskedasticity. The 
results suggest there is not existence of such violation that could set in doubt 
the validity of the model used. 
 
4.1.3 Equality testing on LBO firms and control sample 
The objective of the empirical process applied in this section is to determine the 
factors that affect the probability of going private through LBO. To identify 
typical operating characteristics among the buyout targets, the mean and 
median values of the previously discussed variables have been reported for both 
LBO firms and peer groups. Two-tailed test and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests 
are applied to test for significant differences in mean and median values, 
respectively.  
In some cases the two tests show different significance levels for the 
variables. Median is assumed to be better suited for skewed distributions, 
whereas mean is largely influenced by outliers and suits better for normal 
distributions (Brooks, 2008). Therefore, median is assumed to provide more 
robust evidence for rejecting the null hypothesis of no differences in the 
variables examined for buyout firms and their peers prior to the deal 
announcement.  
Table 9 lists and compares the mean and median values of the above 
variables for the LBO sample and peer groups. Test results indicate that there 
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are significant differences in the means and medians in cash flow volatility and 
maturity metrics, whereas growth and leverage measures have statistically 
significant medians. These results agree with the assumptions discussed in 
previous sections according to which LBO targets are usually mature 
businesses with low capex requirements. In addition, they are mostly firms with 
less volatile cash flows that provide much security from a debt provider’s 
perspective concerning the debt servicing. On the other hand, firms that are of 
more chances to go private through LBOs are assumed to be performing lower 
growth rates compared to each peers, an assumption that is supported by the 
significant difference in the median values of growth variable. Less powerful in 
terms of statistical significance, is the difference in leverage medians that 
supports the hypothesis that LBO targets should have lower leverage rates to 
bear the additional debt burdens required for such transactions.  
Concerning the results related to the free cash flow hypothesis, differences 
in EBITDA margin – the free cash flow metric – are not significant and the 
difference in medians is negative. This finding is in contrast with the theory 
according to which the major motivation of LBOs is the mitigation of agency 
costs related to high free cash flow. Concerning ROA, the results do not support 
any hypothesis about operating efficiency in determining LBO likelihood. 
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Table 9: Mean and Median values of variables for LBO targets and peer groups and corresponding p-values 
 
***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level  
 
***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level  
 
Panel A: Revenues growth of last fiscal year prior to the buyout announcement for LBO firms and peer groups 
 LBO Firms Peer Group Significance tests 
Mean 0.1579 0.1787 
Difference in means -0,0208 
Two-tailed test p-value  0.6001 
Median 0.0906 0.1468 
Difference in medians -0.0562 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney p-value      0.0402** 
Panel B: EBITDA margin of last fiscal year prior to the buyout announcement for LBO firms and peer groups 
 LBO Firms Peer Group Significance tests 
Mean 0.2052 0.1765 
Difference in means 0.0287 
Two-tailed test p-value 0.2172 
Median 0.1451 0.1457 
Difference in medians -0.006 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney p-value 0.9506 
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***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level  
 
***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level  
 
 
Panel C: Standard deviation of EBITDA margin 3 fiscal years prior to the buyout announcement for LBO firms and peer groups 
 LBO Firms Peer Group Significance tests 
Mean 0.0229 0.0324 
Difference in means -0.0095 
Two-tailed test p-value     0.0960* 
Median 0.0128 0.0170 
Difference in medians  -0.0042 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney p-value       0.0340** 
Panel D: Capital expenditures to total assets of last fiscal year prior to the buyout announcement for LBO firms and peer groups 
 LBO Firms Peer Group Significance tests 
Mean 0.0364 0.0680 
Difference in means -0.0316 
Two-tailed test p-value       0.0351** 
Median 0.0349 0.0550 
Difference in medians  -0.0201 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney p-value       0.0156** 
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***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level  
 
***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level  
 
Panel E: ROA of last year before buyout for LBO firms and peer groups 
 LBO Firms Peer Group Significance tests 
Mean 0.0995 0.0915 
Difference in means 0.0080 
Two-tailed test p-value 0.4259 
Median 0.0918 0.0940 
Difference in medians -0.0022 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney p-value 0.8746 
Panel F: Debt-to-equity ratio of last year before the buyout period for LBO firms and peer groups 
 LBO Firms Peer Group Significance tests 
Mean 0.9378 0.6821 
Difference in means  0.2557 
Two-tailed test p-value  0.4301 
Median 0.5337 0.6323 
Difference in medians -0.0986 
Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney p-value    0.0771* 
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4.1.4  Logit Regression Results 
To determine the firm characteristics that explain the likelihood of LBOs, we 
use a logistic regression whose dependent variable is a binary that takes the 
value 1 for firms that went through LBO and 0 for peer groups. Independent 
variables have been found not to be correlated and are simultaneously included 
in the model applied. Table 10 presents the results. 
Table 10: Logistic Regression Analysis of LBO likelihood 
 
Variable z-statistic 
(p-values) 
REVGRTH_1_0 
 0.5489 
  (0.5196) 
EBITBAM_0 
3.6669 
      (0.0069)*** 
EBITDAVOL 
 -14.7804 
     (0.0368)** 
CAPEXPR 
-5.0078 
      (0.0503)** 
ROA 
1.9272 
   (0.5470) 
D_E 
   0.03263 
  (0.6501) 
C 
 -0.2792 
 (0.5669) 
N 144 
McFadden R
2
 0.067 
***significant at 1% level, **significant at 5% level, *significant at 10% level  
 
Note: The dependent variable is an LBO dummy that equals 1 if the company is an LBO target 
and O otherwise. Probability value associated with the z-statistic that a coefficient is 
statistically different from zero is given in parentheses. Standard error estimates are robust to 
heteroskedasticity (Huber/White).  
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The results show that EBITDA margin, EBITDA volatility and capital 
expenditures ratio have the predicted sign and are statistically significant. In 
other words, a firm is more likely to go through a public-to-private transaction 
the greater its free cash flow of the firm, the less volatile its cash flow profile or 
the less its capital requirements. The other variables of the model do not display 
significant values.  
Table 11: Marginal effects after logit 
Variables dx/dy Standard Error Z P>|z| 
REVGR_1_0 0.137 0.211 0.65 0.516 
EBITBAM_0 0.842 0.398 2.12 0.034 
EBITDAVOL -3.695 200.773 -1.84 0.066 
CAPEXPR -1.252 0.575 -2.18 0.030 
ROA 0.482 0.805 0.6 0.549 
D_E 0.008 0.028 0.3 0.768 
 
Table 11 contains the marginal effects whose values can be intuitively 
interpreted in terms of how incremental changes in the independent variables 
can affect the probability of LBO. An increase in the EBITDA margin by one 
unit will increase the likelihood of LBO by 0.842 %. Similarly, an increase by 
one unit in the standard deviation of last 3 years EBITDA will reduce the 
probability of LBO by 3.695 %, indicating that the volatility of cash flows 
generated by the LBO target is an important factor in determining LBO 
likelihood. Similarly, an increase by one unit in the capital expenditure ratio, 
whose value is supposed to be lower for more mature businesses, the 
probability of the firm to go private through LBO falls by 1.252 %. 
The other factors examined are not significant and their explanatory power 
is weaker and less robust. Moreover, the coefficients of the growth and leverage 
variables are different from the expected ones. Therefore, according to the 
results an increase in the growth rate or in the debt-to-equity ratio by one unit 
will result in probability enhancement by 0.137% and 0.008%, respectively 
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Theory suggests, however, that low growth and low leverage companies are 
more likely to go through LBOs. Regarding ROA, the marginal effect sign and 
magnitude suggests that when other factors remain equal, an increase by one 
unit in the ratio leads to the likelihood of LBO rising by 0.482%. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
5.1 CONCLUSIONS 
This study analyzed the recent wave of public-to-private buyouts in Europe. 
Although much research has been done on such transactions taking place in the 
U.S. especially in the 1980s, there is limited evidence on European LBO 
activity, including both the boom of late 1990s and the collapse after the debt 
market crisis in 2008. The purpose of this analysis was to quantify the 
shareholder wealth gains surrounding the announcement of the deal and also 
identify the sources of these gains. Moreover, the LBO firms of the sample 
were investigated in terms of potential characteristics that indicate likelihood 
for a public company to go private through LBO. 
A total sample of 127 transactions that took place between 1998 and 2011 
has been investigated. Empirical findings show that pre-buyout shareholders 
gained almost 7.10% significant abnormal returns on the announcement day 
and cumulative abnormal returns of about 9.50% over a three-day period 
surrounding this event. Moreover, empirical results showed that firms with low 
growth rates and are historically undervalued by the market experience high 
abnormal returns. The findings also indicate that high amount of undistributed 
cash flow is associated with the wealth gains supporting the hypothesis that the 
mitigation of agency costs generates significant returns. However, we do not 
find significance for other sources of positive excess returns, such as the risk or 
the size of the firms that other studies identified to have explanatory power. 
The thesis proceeds by examining the buyout firms for typical operating 
characteristics that affect the likelihood for LBO. For 72 companies with 
available pre-buyout data there have been assigned peer groups of public 
companies. The two sub-samples were then compared in terms of key 
characteristics that theory suggests as important determinants of LBO 
likelihood. Empirical evidence highlighted differences in many performance 
indicators between the two sub-samples. In addition, logistic regression analysis 
showed that the likelihood for company to go private through LBO instead of 
remaining public is linked to the maturity of the company and to the amount 
and stability of cash flow generated by its operations. Empirical results 
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supported Jensen’s free cash flow theory according to which the agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders over the distribution of free cash 
flow are the main driver for LBO activity. Consequently, mature businesses 
with established cash flow generation and low capital expenditures were found 
more likely LBO targets. On the contrary, no evidence has been found in favour 
of other factors that have been proved significant by prior literature. The growth 
rates, the pre-buyout leverage and the operating profitability were not found to 
be associated with the companies’ decision to go private through LBO. 
The above results are consistent to a great extent with the free cash flow 
hypothesis similarly to prior studies. No matter the changes in the capital 
market conditions among years, agency theory is supported by the current 
study. Overall, private equity market appears to be quite uniform across time 
and geographic areas. 
Concluding, this study has provided new insights into the private equity 
industry which could be useful for market participants interested in such 
investment opportunities. From the perspective of public investors who have 
invested in the companies which go private through LBOs, the results provide 
additional evidence on the magnitude and the sources of the abnormal returns 
expected following LBOs announcements. On the other hand, from the 
perspective of private equity professionals, this thesis has illustrated the major 
characteristics which favour LBO transactions and thus can indicate potential 
LBO candidates. 
At this point, it could be useful to highlight some interested issues raised 
by the analysis applied in this thesis. Taking into consideration that this study 
does not account for the potential success or failure of the deals investigated, a 
research on the determinants of LBO success could be performed. In addition, 
the number of deals that took place after the financial crisis was relative small. 
A sub-sample of post-crisis transactions would be inconclusive and thus 
unsuitable for statistical inferences. Changes of private equity transactions 
following the toughening of market conditions could be an interesting topic in 
the future. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Correlation matrix for the independent variables of the OLS regression  
Variables FCF ratio Tobin’s q ratio 
Variance of 
returns 
Size 
FCF ratio 1 
   
Tobin’s q ratio 0.22 1 
  
Variance of 
returns 
0.06 -0.02 1 
 
Size 0.28 0.07 0.04 1 
 
 
Appendix 2: Tests on OLS regression residuals (Market model) 
Test for heteroskedasticity 
(White) 
Test for autocorrelation 
(Breusch - Godfrey) 
Test for normality  
(Jarque – Bera) 
Ho: The variance is 
constant across residuals 
Ho: Residuals are of zero 
autocorrelation 
Ho: Residuals are normally 
distributed 
F-statistic 0.71 F-statistic 0.29 Jarque-Bera  131.55 
Probability 0.78 Probability 0.92 Probability 0.00 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Tests on OLS regression residuals (Market – adjusted model) 
Test for heteroskedasticity 
(White) 
Test for autocorrelation 
(Breusch - Godfrey) 
Test for normality  
(Jarque – Bera) 
Ho: The variance is constant 
across residuals 
Ho: Residuals are of zero 
autocorrelation 
Ho: Residuals are normally 
distributed 
F-statistic 0.76 F-statistic 0.40 Jarque-Bera  150.40 
Probability 0.74 Probability 0.85 Probability 0.00 
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Appendix 4: Correlation matrix for the independent variables of the Logit regression 
Variables REVGR_1_0 EBITBAM_0 EBITDAVOL CAPEXPR ROA D_E 
REVGR_1_0 1 
 
  
  
EBITBAM_0 0.07 1   
  
EBITDAVOL 0.22 0.35 1  
  
CAPEXPR 0.32 0.11 0.08 1 
  
ROA -0.09 -0.13 -0.20 0.01 1 
 
D_E 0.02 0.06 -0.09 -0.01 0.10 1 
 
